DF按
这是 New York Times 纽约时报4月13日的文章
原文链接在此 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/opinion/13forney.html
图片也是NYT网站配的图
新华网一鳞半爪地拣了一小部分翻译了出来 和一些其它外媒的文章凑在一起发在这里 http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-04/15/content_7979648.htm
DF尝试简略翻译一下全文
4.15早上根据larere的版本修正了部分翻译 特此感谢larere的贡献~
China’s Loyal Youth 中国的忠诚青年
MANY sympathetic Westerners view Chinese society along the lines of what they saw in the waning days of the Soviet Union: a repressive government backed by old hard-liners losing its grip to a new generation of well-educated, liberal-leaning sophisticates. As pleasant as this outlook may be, it’s naïve. Educated young Chinese, far from being embarrassed or upset by their government’s human-rights record, rank among the most patriotic, establishment-supporting people you’ll meet.
很多富有同情心的西方人视中国社会为当年的苏联：一个由老派人士执掌的压抑的政府，渐渐对富有良好教育的、思想开放且世故的一代新人失去了控制。这观念看上去有趣，实际上很幼稚。有文化的中国青年们，根本不会对他们的政府在人权方面的作为而感到困窘。恰恰相反，他们是你所能见到的人中最爱国图强的一群。
As is clear to anyone who lives here, most young ethnic Chinese strongly support their government’s suppression of the recent Tibetan uprising. One Chinese friend who has a degree from a European university described the conflict to me as “a clash between the commercial world and an old aboriginal society.” She even praised her government for treating Tibetans better than New World settlers treated Native Americans.
任何人都能明显看到，海外年轻华人强烈支持近日中国政府对西藏骚乱的镇压行动。一个在欧洲某大学拥有学位的中国朋友这样描述这起冲突：商业世界与老旧的土著社会的对抗。她甚至赞赏中国政府对待藏人比“新世界”开拓者对待北美土著人要好很多。
It’s a rare person in China who considers the desires of the Tibetans themselves. “Young Chinese have no sympathy for Tibet,” a Beijing human-rights lawyer named Teng Biao told me. Mr. Teng — a Han Chinese who has offered to defend Tibetan monks caught up in police dragnets — feels very alone these days. Most people in their 20s, he says, “believe the Dalai Lama is trying to split China.”
在中国几乎不会见到有人站在藏人的立场考虑。“中国青年对西藏完全没有同情”，一个北京的人权律师滕彪(音)告诉我。身为汉族的滕先生曾为遭政治牵连的藏僧提供辩护，可是最近却觉得很孤独——“大部分20多岁的人认为达赖打算分裂中国”，滕说。
Educated young people are usually the best positioned in society to bridge cultures, so it’s important to examine the thinking of those in China. The most striking thing is that, almost without exception, they feel rightfully proud of their country’s accomplishments in the three decades since economic reforms began. And their pride and patriotism often find expression in an unquestioning support of their government, especially regarding Tibet.
受过教育的年轻人通常是社会中最有条件在不同文化之间搭建桥梁的人，因此考察他们的思想很重要。最令人惊异的是，他们几乎无一例外对中国30年来改革开放取得的成就理直气壮地感到骄傲。他们的爱国心和自豪感常常表现为绝对支持政府，在西藏问题上尤其如此。
The most obvious explanation for this is the education system, which can accurately be described as indoctrination. Textbooks dwell on China’s humiliations at the hands of foreign powers in the 19th century as if they took place yesterday, yet skim over the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and ’70s as if it were ancient history. Students learn the neat calculation that Chairman Mao’s tyranny was “30 percent wrong,” then the subject is declared closed. The uprising in Tibet in the late 1950s, and the invasion that quashed it, are discussed just long enough to lay blame on the “Dalai clique,” a pejorative reference to the circle of advisers around Tibet’s spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama.
对此最明显的解释是中国的教育体制，更确切地说是“灌输”。教科书反复渲染19世纪中国在外国列强铁蹄下的屈辱，但却略过了60、70年代的文革。学生们(关于文革)只是学到精确地计算“毛主席当时的强权有30%是错误的”，这课题便到此为止了。西藏在50年代后期的动乱以及随后(中国政府)的“侵略”和平复这段历史，只是被拿来学习以便指责 上个世纪50年代后期的西藏动乱以及随后中国政府入侵镇压的历史，教科书中对其的描述仅止于引发人们对“达赖集团”的谴责。“达赖集团”是对西藏精神领袖达赖及其谋士们的轻蔑称呼。
Then there’s life experience — or the lack of it — that might otherwise help young Chinese to gain a perspective outside the government’s viewpoint. Young urban Chinese study hard and that’s pretty much it. Volunteer work, sports, church groups, debate teams, musical skills and other extracurricular activities don’t factor into college admission, so few participate. And the government’s control of society means there aren’t many non-state-run groups to join anyway. Even the most basic American introduction to real life — the summer job — rarely exists for urban students in China.
他们的生活经历，或者说是因为他们缺乏“真正的生活”，使得这些年轻中国人无法得到他们政府观点之外的认知。城市里的中国青年成天只是刻苦学习。志愿者工作、体育运动、教堂群组、辩论赛、音乐技能以及其他课外活动都不是大学录取的考量因素，所以鲜有人参与。同时，在政府的控制之下，只有很少的民间组织可供他们参与。即使对于美国青年来说最基本的社会生活内容，暑期打工，在中国城市学生中都是很少见的。
Recent Chinese college graduates are an optimistic group. And why not? The economy has grown at a double-digit rate for as long as they can remember. Those who speak English are guaranteed good jobs. Their families own homes. They’ll soon own one themselves, and probably a car too. A cellphone, an iPod, holidays — no problem. Small wonder the Pew Research Center in Washington described the Chinese in 2005 as “world leaders in optimism.”
近来的中国大学毕业生是一个乐观的群体。为什么不呢？从他们懂事起，经济就以两位数的增速在发展。会英语的人就有了良好的工作保障。他们的家人拥有房屋，而他们不仅房子，连车子都即将拥有。手机，ipod随身听，假期，都不在话下。难怪华盛顿的Pew研究中心形容2005年的中国人是“世界上最乐观的”。
As for political repression, few young Chinese experience it. Most are too young to remember the Tiananmen massacre of 1989 and probably nobody has told them stories. China doesn’t feel like a police state, and the people young Chinese read about who do suffer injustices tend to be poor — those who lost homes to government-linked property developers without fair compensation or whose crops failed when state-supported factories polluted their fields.
至于政治压抑，极少数年轻人曾切身经历过。他们大多不记得八九动乱，而且恐怕没人给他们讲述这些。中国并不是警察国家，青年们可以通过阅读得知，受到不公正待遇的大多是穷人：那些房产被与政府有关联的开发商用廉价收购的人，或者被政府扶植企业抢了饭碗的生意人。(“China doesn’t feel like a police state 中国并不是警察国家”这句有点不通，因为DF也没读太明白。还情高人指点) 中国人并不觉得自己生活在严密控制之下，而且年轻人只有通过报道才了解得到的那些受到不公正待遇的人通常都是穷人，那些被有政府背景的开发商剥夺了家园却得不到相应补偿的人，还有被政府扶植企业污染了田地没有收成的农民。
Educated young Chinese are therefore the biggest beneficiaries of policies that have brought China more peace and prosperity than at any time in the past thousand years. They can’t imagine why Tibetans would turn up their noses at rising incomes and the promise of a more prosperous future. The loss of a homeland just doesn’t compute as a valid concern.
在这为中国带来千百年未有的和平昌盛的政策之下，中国青年成了最大的受益者。他们无法想象为什么西藏人在持续增长的收入和光明的前景面前为什么还要起来捣乱。“失去家园”(对中国青年而言)并不是一个很值得考虑的因素。
Of course, the nationalism of young Chinese may soften over time. As college graduates enter the work force and experience their country’s corruption and inefficiency, they often grow more critical. It is received wisdom in China that people in their 40s are the most willing to challenge their government, and the Tibet crisis bears out that observation. Of the 29 ethnic-Chinese intellectuals who last month signed a widely publicized petition urging the government to show restraint in the crackdown, not one was under 30.
当然，中国青年的爱国主义也许常常超越了时代。当然，中国年轻人的爱国主义精神随着时间演变可能不再那么尖锐鲜明。当大学毕业生们走上社会参加工作，并体会到国家的腐败与无能，他们往往成长得更富批评性。中国式的智慧表明，40岁左右的人最可能挑战他们的政府，而西藏危机恰恰印证了这一点。上个月联名签署并广为传播一项呼吁政府对镇压行动做出约束的动议的29名海外华人，无一人为30岁以下。
Barring major changes in China’s education system or economy, Westerners are not going to find allies among the vast majority of Chinese on key issues like Tibet, Darfur and the environment for some time. If the debate over Tibet turns this summer’s contests in Beijing into the Human Rights Games, as seems inevitable, Western ticket-holders expecting to find Chinese angry at their government will instead find Chinese angry at them.
中国教育制度和经济的重大改变所带来的隔阂，使得西方人无法在中国大多数人中找到同盟，特别是在诸如西藏、达尔富尔、环境问题等关键性问题上。关于西藏的争论似乎不可避免地在使今年夏天北京的竞赛演变成一场人权大战，如果这样的话，西方各大势力将会发现中国人愤怒的矛头不会如他们期待的一般指向中国政府，而是指向他们西方人。
Matthew Forney, a former Beijing bureau chief for Time, is writing a book about raising his family in China.
作者马修·弗尔尼 前《时代》杂志北京办事处主任，现在正撰写一本关于他如何在中国养家的书
* 后记
我全文译发 并不代表我全部赞同
只是今晚太晚了 明后天再写观感
另外 吭吭吭地翻译也不容易 还望大家认真阅读 积极发表感想
Powered by FireStats